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IN THE SUP·REME COURT
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH

THE CHEMICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION,

Petitioner,
Case
No. 9360

-vs.TI-IE STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Respondent.

BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties herein will be designated as follows: Petitioner, the Chemical and Industrial Corporation, as
''Chemical and Industrial Corporation,'' and respondent,
State Tax Commission of Utah, as the "Tax Commission.'' Emphasis has been supplied.
This is a proceeding to review an order and decision
of the Tax Commission imposing a use tax liability and
deficiency upon the Chemical and Industrial Corporation.
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The deficiency assessment was based upon the purchase
and furnishing of materials and supplies by the petitioner
as the consumer of such supplies and materials delivered
and stored in the state of Utah and used for the construction of an ammonium nitrate plant of the United
States Steel Corporation, Columbia- Geneva Division
(hereinafter denominated Geneva).
Three principal questions are presented by this appeal. They are: (1) whether or not the petitioner was
the owner of the materials at the time they ended their
transit in interstate commerce; (2) \Vhether or not the petitioner was present within the state of Utah and in possession of the materials used in the construction of the
facility during a taxable moment; and (3) whether or not
the assessment of this deficiency to the petitioner constitutes an undue burden upon interstate commerce or violates the provisions of the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees substantially with the statement of facts as set forth by the petitioner. In addition
thereto, the following facts are submitted:
The deficiency in the present case arose out of a
prime contract between the Columbia-Geneva Steel Division of United States Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox
Company, in which agreement the Blaw-I{nox Company
agreed to furnish and pay for all labor and materials and
services not furnished by Geneva and to do and to per2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

form all things necessary for the completion and construction of an ammonium nitrate facility at Geneva,
Utah. This agreement was made on the 6th day of July,
1956. Blaw-Knox, in turn, subcontracted the ammonium
nitrate facility to the Chemical and Industrial Corporation in an agreement dated November 13, 1956, in which
the present petitioner agreed to purchase the materials
and perform the work necessary for the completion of
the ammonium nitrate facility. By contract dated November 23, 1956, the petitioner contracted with its wholly
owned subsidiary, the Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, under the terms of which contract the
Chemical and Industrial Construction Company agreed
to furnish labor, tools and equipment necessary to perform the work. The petitioner subsequently purchased
all necessary materials and supplies required for the performance of the subcontract from vendors not residents
of the state of Utah by contracts executed outside of the
state of Utah. Such materials were then shipped by the
petitioner in interstate commerce to the plant site in Utah
where they were received by the Chemical and Industrial
Construction Company.
Because of the nature of the issues, the time of passage of title to the materials and supplies purchased becomes extremely important. To determine the passage of
title to these materials it becomes necessary to analyze
the import of the three main contractual documents which
govern the purchase of the supplies, their shipment, and
later storage and use in the state of Utah. A summary of
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the three contracts, together with references to the actual
contract documents, is set forth as follows:
1. CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION, COLUMBIA-GENEVA DIVISION AND BLAW-KNOX COMPANY AS PRIMARY CONTRACTOR.

Under the terms of this agreement, Blaw-Knox
agreed to furnish and pay for all labor and materials and
services not furnished by U. S. Steel and to do and perform all things necessary for the construction and completion of the work (Paragraph 1). Blaw-Knox was denominated the contractor, and it was further agreed that prior
to the completion of the work by the contractor and the
acceptance thereof by the owner the work was to remain
at the risk of the contractor, and the contractor was to be
responsible for all loss and damage however caused,
whether or not due to the fault of the contractor. (Paragraph 12) The work to be done was specified as furnishing and paying for all labor, materials, supplies, services,
tools, equipment, utilities, transportation facilities and
plant not furnished by Geneva, and to do and perform all
things necessary for the construction and completion of
facilities for the production of anhydrous ammonia and
associated nitrogen compounds. (Paragraph 1) BlawKnox further agreed to pay all sales, use, excise, transportation, privilege, and other taxes. (Paragraph 15)
The agreement was denominated by the parties as a turnkey contract. (Letter from E. W. Forker, Vice President
and General Manager, of Blaw-I{nox Company to H. W.
4
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( ~hristensen, Director of Purchases, Columbia-Geneva
Steel Division, United States Steel Corporation, dated
June 18, 1955, paragraph 15.) The Tax Commission found
a turnkey contract to be a contract in which the seller or
contractor agrees to build a plant or facility and to furnish the complete facilities or plant installed and in operating condition to the extent of instructing employees of
the purchaser in its operation, and that the final payment for the facility in such a contract is deferred until
said facility is installed, operating and accepted by the
purchaser. The contract further provided that Geneva
could, under certain conditions, elect to complete the work
itself, but that after so doing it should return any unexpended materials and supplies to Blaw-Knox. (Paragraph 4) Final payment was not to be made until acceptance, and partial payments were not considered as acceptance of work not in conformance with the terms of
the contract. (Paragraph 24) It then agreed to assume
the risk of loss or damage to that portion of facilities so
occupied. (Paragraph 12)
Blaw-Knox did not purchase any materials or supplies, instead if elected to subcontract most of the work
to the Chemical and Industrial Corporation. As a result,
the following contract was signed dated November 13,
1956.
2. CONTRACT BETWEEN BLAW-KNOX COMpANY AND THE CHEMICAL AND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION.

5
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This contract provided that petitioner was obliged
to furnish all materials, supplies, equipment, labor, services, etc., necessary for the construction of the ammonium
nitrate plant. (Article 1) Petitioner agreed to be respon- •
sible for all materials delivered and work performed until
completed and final acceptance. It further agreed to pay
all federal, state and local taxes levied upon the subcontractor. (Article XXXI) The subcontract between BlawI{nox Company and the Chemical and Industrial Corporation also contained the following significant provisions:
''Article I. DEFINITIONs
(c) The term 'Work' includes all labor and/or materials to be furnished by Subcontractor as provided in the Purchase Order, and, unless otherwise provided in the Subcontract Documents, Subcontractor shall furnish and pay for all materials,
labor, supervision, tools and equipment, administration, transportation, handling, storage, services, supplies, temporary sheds for housing workmen, materials, tools and equipment, and other
facilities necessary for the execution and completion of the Work.''
''Article XVIII. TITLE
The title to all Work completed and in the course
of construction at the site and of all materials
which are delivered and stored at the site and
which will necessarily he inrorporated into the
Work as between Contractor, Owner and Subcontractor, shall be in the Owner.''
The original contract was not incorporated in the
subcontract by reference. Petitioner subsequently contracted with its wholly owned subsidiary, Chemical and
Industrial Construction Company.
6
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3. CON':rHACT BETvVEEN CHEMICAL AND
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION AND THE CHE_JIICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY DATED NOVEJ\IBER 23, 1956.
This contract provided that the construction company
was to furnish labor, tools and equipment to construct the
ammonium nitrate facilities. The contract further provided that title to the materials delivered an.d stored at
the site would necessarily be in Geneva Steel, which was
denominated by the parties as the owner. (Tr. 142, 167174) (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, petitioner purchased all the supplies
and materials necessary for the fulfillment of the contract
and shipped such materials and supplies in interstate commerce to the plantsite in Utah where they were received
by the Chemical and Industrial Construction Company.
All labor and services required in the construction work
were then provided by the construction company as a
wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner engaged in the
actual construction of the facilities.
The outline of the Chemical and Industrial Corporation's contractual relationships, as set out on Pages 14-15
of this Brief may be helpful in reaching a determination
of the issues.

7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT

I

PETITIONER WAS THE OWNER OF THE
:MATERIALS INVOLVED HEREIN DURING
A TAXABLE MOMENT WITHIN THE STATE
OF UTAH.
PoiNT

II

PETITIONER WAS PRESENT IN THE
STATE OF UTAH AND IN POSSESSION OF
THE MATERIALS HEREIN INVOLVED SO
AS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE TAXING POW. ER OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

III
THE ASSESSMENT OF USE TAX AGAINST
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
PoiNT

POINT

IV

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, COLUMBIA-GENEVA DIVISION, AND THE BLAWl{NOX COMPANY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

PETITIONER WAS THE OWNER OF THE
MATERIALS INVOLVED HEREIN DURING
A TAXABLE MOMENT WITHIN THE STATE
OF UTAH.
It is clearly shown by the evidence that the petitioner vvas the original purchaser and that it did at one
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time hold title to all of the materials so purchased and
which are the subject matter of this assessment. The difference of opinion related to the time at which the petitioner lost ownership of such materials. The Tax Commission's position is based upon the interpretation of all
pertinent contracts and may be set forth as follows : First,
that it is impossible to impose upon the United States
Steel Corporation terms to which it did not agree; and,
that any attempt to determine the passage of title to the
materials herein involved must necessarily include the
agreement to which the United States Steel Corporation
is a party. The only contract which meets these requirements is the contract dated July 6, 1956, of which the
following paragraphs are pertinent:
Paragraph 1. Description of the work.
''Contractor shall furnish and pay for all labor,
materials, supplies, services, tools, equipment,
utilities, transportation facilities and plant, not
furnished by owner, and do and perform all things
necessary for the construction and completion of
facilities for the production of anhydrous ammonia and associated nitrogen compounds, which said
work is described in owner's specification No.
GW-55-31 ... "
Paragraph 12 is titled "Responsibility for Work"
and provides in part :
"Prior to the completion of the work by Contractor and the acceptance thereof by Owner, the
work shall remain at the risk of Contractor and
Contractor shall be responsible for all loss and
damage to the work and shall repair, renew and
make good, at its own expense, all such loss and
9
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damage however caused, whether or not due to the
fault of the Contractor and including, but not limited to loss or damage caused by collision, riot,
fire or force or violence of the elements. To the
extent that such loss or damage is not covered by
the insurance to be maintained by Contractor hereunder, Contractor shall not be liable in the event
that such loss or damage is due to the sole negligence of Owner's employees (unless such loss or
damage directly results from directions given such
employees by Contractor). In the event that, pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 24 (c), Owner
accepts and occupies a portion of the facility prior
to acceptance of the entire facilities, Owner shall
assume all risk of loss or damage to such portion
of the facilities.''
It was clearly understood between the parties that
the United States Steel should not bear any tax burden
regarding the construction of the facility. Paragraph 15,
entitled ''Taxes,'' provides :
''Contractor shall pay all contributions, taxes and
premiums payable under Federal, State and local
laws measured upon payroll of employees engaged
in the performance of work under this contract
and all sales, use excise, transportation, privilege,
occupational, and other taxes as they were in force
as of April 29, 1955, and at rates then existing
applicable to materials and supplies furnished for
work performed hereunder and shall save Owner
harmless from liability for any such contributions,
premiums, and taxes .... ''
Section 4, entitled "Conditions Under \Yhich Owner
May Complete Work,'' provides that the owner under certain conditions may finish the work by terminating his

10
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contract, and that having properly elected to do so the
owner:
''may enter upon the premises and take possession
of all materials, tools, equipment, facilities and
supplies thereon, and may finish the work with its
own forces and may provide the necessary labor
and additional materials, tools, equipment, facilities and supplies for finishing the work, or Owner
may employ any other person or persons to finish the said work. . . . Any unexpended materials,
tools, equipment, facilities and supplies furnished
by contractor for the work shall be returned to it
following the completion thereof. ... " (Emphasis
supplied)
Paragraph 24, entitled'' Completion and Acceptance,''
provides that after the contractor has finished its construction work that it is to carry on a test of mechanical
functioning; that thereafter the owner may begin a twoweek testing period; and further provides in Subsection
(b) that:

"Contractor shall make written request for a.cceptance of the work by Owner when in Contractor's
opinion the specifications as to performance expressly guaranteed by Contractor hereunder have
been met and determined by the result of one of
the 48-hour test-runs a;nd all other work has been
completed. Not later than thirty ( 30) da.ys after
Contractor has submitted to Owner such request
for acceptance, Own.er, if in a.greement, shall in
writing accept the work .... " (Emphasis supplied)
Subsection (c) of Paragraph 24 further provides :
''In the event Owner wishes to occupy a portion
of the ''Tork prior to acceptance of the entire work,
such portion shall be tested and accepted under the
11
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procedures of this Section 24 subject only to the
results of the final test of the integrated plant and
after occupancy Owner shall assume all risk of loss
or damage to such portion of the work.''
That there is no basis in the agreement between the
United States Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox Company for the position that title to all materials prior
to their incorporation in the work was in the United
States Steel Corporation is evidenced by the abovecited provision 24 of the contract. Provision 24 in substance provides that the United States Steel Corporation
shall accept the facilities upon completion and final test of
the integrated plant by the contractor. United States Steel
made no agreement, either with Blaw-Knox Company or
wih the Chemical and Industrial Corporation or the
Chemical and Industrial Construction Company, to receive title to these materials as personal property prior
to their incorporation in the plant. This, therefore, places
the tax liability clearly upon the subcontractor, Chemical and Industrial Corporation, as coming within the
Sales and Use Tax Regulation No. 58, which states:
''II. Where the contractor or subcontractor
agrees for a lump sum to furnish materials, supplies and necessary services, the sale to him of the
materials and supplies is taxable as he becomes
the final consumer or user. . . . The sales or use
tax on materials and supplies expended or used in
performance of a lump-sum contract is the cost of
the contractor or subcontractor, and is not to be
billed separately to the owner of the real
property.''

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

From the foregoing contractual provisiOns, it is
apparent that title to the materials and supplies furnished
by the petitioner, delivered within the state of Utah, and
intended to be incorporated in the facility at Geneva, did
not pass to Geneva until final acceptance of the same by
the United States Steel Corporation.
It is further apparent that as the Chemical and Industrial Construction Company never took title or agreed
to perform anything except necessary labor upon the
materials and supplies furnished, that the ownership of
these materials and supplies during the time they were
stored and used in Utah was necessarily in the Chemical
and Industrial Corporation.
Assuming, but not conceding, the interpretation of
the contractual documents as contended by petitioner, it
is submitted that the same result is forthcoming even
though the prime contract between the United States
Steel Corporation and Blaw-Knox Company is not used
in making the determination.
The petitioner contends that Article XVIII of petitioner's subcontract with Blaw-Knox Company (hereinafter referred to as Blaw-Knox) is determinative of this
issue. Article XVIII provides as follows:
''The title to all work completed and in the course
of construction at the site and all materials which
are delivered and stored at the site and which
shall necessarily be incorporated in the work, as
between Contractor [Blaw-Knox], Owner [ Geneva] and Subcontractor [petitioner] shall be in
Owner.''

13
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Petitioner interprets this article to mean that at the moment that the interstate shipment of the materials in question ceased, the title to the materials passed instantly
from petitioner to Geneva. Respondent, however, contends
that such is not the meaning of Article XVIII and that
even were we to concede that Article XVIII were to determine the point at which title to the materials passed to
Geneva, that there would be a taxable moment when petitioner would be subject to a use tax thereon.
Article I of petitioner's contract with Blaw-Knox,
although entitled "Definitions," provides as follows:
" (c) The term 'work' includes all labor and/or
materials to be furnished by Subcontractor [petitioner] as provided in the Purchase Order, and,
unless otherwise provided in the Subcontract Documents, Subcontractor shall furnish and pay for
all materials, labor, supervision, tools and equipment, administration, transportation, handling,
storage, services, supplies, temporary sheds for
housing workmen, materials, tools and equipment,
and other facilities necessary for the execution and
completion of the work.''
Thus, petitioner was required not only to purchase and
store the materials for this project, but was required to
provide the temporary sheds for storing the same.
It is admitted that even by the clear terms of Article
XVIII, the title to the materials did not pass from petitioner to Geneva until the materials were ''delivered and

stored at the site.'' (Emphasis supplied)

16
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Section 59-16-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
iu part:
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on the
storage, use or other consumption in this state of
tangible personal property purchased on or after
July 1, 1937, for storage, use or other consumption
in this state at the rate of two per cent of the sales
price of such property." (Emphasis supplied)
"Storage" is defined by Section 59-16-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows:
'' (a) 'Storage' means and includes any keeping
or retention in this state for any purpose except
sale in the regular course of business of tangible
personal property purchased from a retailer.''
(Emphasis supplied)
Even construing Article XVIII most favorably to petitioner it is respectfully submitted, since the material had
to be delivered and stored by petitioner before title could
conceivably pass to Geneva, that there was a taxable
moment after the interstate shipment had ceased and before title rested in Geneva. See Southern Pacific v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 563 (1939);
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S.
182, 59 S. Ct. 396, 83 L. Ed. 595 ( 1939).
This conclusion is further substantiated by Section
59-16-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides 1n
part:
''For the purpose of the proper administration
of this act and to prevent evasion of the tax and
the duty to collect the same herein imposed, it shall
17
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be presumed that tangible personal property sold
by any person for delivery in the state is sold for
storage, use or other consumption in this
state.... ''
It is clear that the materials and supplies in question
were sold and purchased for storage, use and consumption
in the state of Utah; they were then shipped to the state
of Utah where they were stored, used and consumed. The
Tax Commission contends that the activities of the petitioner do constitute a keeping or retention or storing in
this state of tangible personal property and that this
keeping or retention is a proper basis upon which the
Tax Commission may levy a use tax. To rule otherwise is
to say that the parties to a construction contract, by intricate manipulation, may purchase materials outside the
state for storage, use and consumption within the state,
in such a way as to avoid paying a tax to the state altogether. To so find is to discriminate against intrastate
contractors and place intrastate sellers in a position
where they cannot compete with interstate sellers.
PoiNT

II

PETITIONER WAS PRESENT IN THE
STATE OF UTAH AND IN POSSESSION OF
THE MATERIALS HEREIN INVOLVED SO
AS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE TAXING POWER OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Assuming for purposes of argument that petitioner
was not the ''owner'' of the said materials, we submit that
the petitioner was present in the state of Utah and in possession of the materials used in the construction of the

18
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facility during a taxable moment. The Supreme Court of
the United States had occasion to examine a factual
situation very similar to this one in the case of Kansas
City Str,uctural Steel Co. v. State of Arkansas, 269 U. S.
148, 46 S. Ct. 59, 70 L. Ed. 204 (1925). In that case the
state of Arkansas had levied a fine of $1,000.00 against
the Kansas City Structural Steel Co. (a Missouri Corporation) for doing business within the state of Arkansas prior to obtaining· permission. On Mar. 3, 1921, the
plaintiff company bid on a bridge job to be constructed
in Arkansas. This bid was accepted, contingent upon the
company's furnishing a bond. The bond was executed two
days late~ in Missouri. On June 14, 1921, the plaintiff
company sublet all the work except the erection of the
steel superstructure to the Young Construction Co., a
Kansas partnership. Subsequently, the plaintiff company
shipped materials from its Kansas City plant addressed
to itself, which were delivered to its subcontractor at
Wilmot, Arkansas, and used by the latter in the work
done by the subcontractor. On August 17, 1921, after the
subcontractor had substantially completed his work,
plaintiff company obtained permission to do business in
the state of Arkansas. However, the state charged the
plaintiff with doing business prior to the date upon which
it obtained permission, and the statutory fine of $1,000.00
was imposed, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Arkansas. The plaintiff company then took the matter to
the United States Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.
The question on appeal was whether the acts done
by the plaintiff company were in interstate commerce or
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whether the company did business of a local, intrastate
nature in Arkansas prior to obtaining permission. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed that the company
had done business of a local, intrastate nature in Arkansas
before obtaining permission. In reasoning thusly, the
Court stated :
'' ... In the case now before the court, the construction of •the bridge necessarily involved some work
and business in Arkansas, which were separate and
distinct from any interstate commerce that might
be involved in the performance of the contract.
From the beginning, transactions local to Arkansas were contemplated. In fact, plaintiff in error
obtained permission to do business in Arkansas
in order to be authorized to erect the steel superstructure - the part of the work it had not sublet.
But before obtaining such permission, it made the
bid and signed the contract in Arkansas; it shipped
from Kansas City to itself at Wilmot the materials
for the work it had sublet, and, after the interstate
transit had ended, delivered them to the subcontractor who used them in the work. We need not
consider whether, under the circumstances shown,
the making of the bid, the signing of the contract
and execution of the bond would be within the
protection of the commerce clause, if these acts
stood alone. But it is certain that, when all are
taken together, the things done by plaintiff in error
in Arkansas before obtaining the permission constitute or include intrastate business. The delivery
of the materials to the subcontractor was essential
to the building of the bridge, and that was oo
intrastate and not an interstate transaction. The
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fact that the materials had moved from Missouri
into Arkansas did not make the delivery of them
to the subcontractor interstate commerce. So far
as concerns the question here involved, the situation is the equivalent of what it would have been
if the materials had been shipped into the State
and held for sale in a warehouse, and had been
furnished to the subcontractor by a dealer. We
think it plain that the plaintiff in error did business of a local and intrastate character in Arkansas before it obtained permission.'' (Citing cases.)
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing language it would appear
that the fact that the construction company shipped materials addressed to itself for the completion of the contract
in Arkansas convinced the Supreme Court that the construction company was present and doing business in
the state, although the materials were actually received
and used by the subcontractor of the construction company. Furthermore, the court indicated that the interstate shipment had ceased prior to the time when the
materials were finally delivered to the subcontractor, and
that the delivery was of an intrastate character, evidencing the presence of the construction company.
The storage and use in California of railroad supplies
and equipment purchased outside ·the state by a l{entucky
corporation which operated an interstate railroad, were
held in Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167,
59 S. Ct. 389, L. Ed. 583 (1939), to be intrastate events
properly subjected to the California Use Tax, even as to
articles ordered out of the state under specifications suitable only for utilization in interstate transportation facili-
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ties and installed immediately on their arrival at the California destination. The Court said that there was a taxable moment when such goods had reached the end of their
interstate transportation and had not begun to be consumed in interstate operation, and that at that moment the
tax on storage and use - retention and exercise of a
right of ownership, respectively- was effective. The further contention that the tax violated the due process
clause because enacted for consumption of office and car
supplies outside the state, upon their appropriation in
California to the use of the whole system, was also rejected since the determination that the taxable event was
the exercise of the property right in California justified
the tax.
And in Oklahoma Taa; Commission v. Stanolind Pipe
Line Co. (CA lOth Oklahoma), 113 F. 2d 853, Cert. Den.
311 U. S. 693, S. Ct. 75, 85 L. Ed. 448 (1940), the Oklahoma use tax was held applicable to equipment and supplies purchased outside Oklahoma by a Maine corporation for immediate installation and repairs on its interstate pipe lines through Oklahoma. The Court, following
the Sottdhern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher case, supra, held
that the retention and exercise of a right of installation of
the property after the termination of its movement in interstate commerce and before the beginning of its use and
consumption in the interstate business, was said to come
well within the terms of the statute. See also Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 Cal. 2d 162, 119 P. 2d
945 (1941); Sugarman Y. Sta.te Board of Equalizatio·n, 51
Cal. 2nd 361, 333 P. 2d 333 (1958); Custom Built Homes
22
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Co. v. Kansas State Commission of Revenue and Taxatioll, 184 l(au. 31, 334 P. 2d 808 (1959); and United Aircraft Corporation v. Conrn.elly, 145 Conn. 176, 140 Atl.
2<1 486 (1958).
In the instant case, therefore, we submit that the
Commission was justified in finding that the petitioner
was present within the state of Utah after the interstate
shipment of the materials in question had ceased, and
that the petitioner thereupon delivered possession of the
materials to its subcontractor for storage or further use
in the construction project. This would constitute a "use"
within the meaning of Section 59-16-2 (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. It would also be sufficient to
justify the Commission in finding the petitioner to be
present within the state during a taxable moment. See
Chicago Bridge & I ron Co. v. J ohn.son, 19 Cal. 2d 162,
119 P. 2d 945 (1941).
PorNT III
THE ASSESSMENT OF USE TAX AGAINST
THE PETITIONER DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE NOR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
For the reasons stated in Point II hereof, we respectfully submit that the assessment of this deficiency to the
petitioner would not unduly burden interstate commerce
or violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. See Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. State of Arkan·sas, 269 U. S. 148, 46 S.
23
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Ct. 59, 70 L. Ed 204 (1925) which holds that shipments in
all respects similar to those in question here had termi·
nated their transit in interstate commerce prior to their
delivery to the subcontractor.
PoiNT

IV

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, COLUl\1:BIA-GENEVA DIVISION, AND THE BLA"\VKNOX COMPANY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
The contract between Geneva and Blaw-Knox Company dated July 6, 1956, is clearly admissible. The propriety of this admission can be readily seen after careful
scutiny of the issues herein. The question of paramount
importance is that of the passage of title to the materials
and supplies used in the performance of the work and
purchased by the petition~r. Clearly, an allegation or
agreement by petitioner with some third party is not
enough to vest title to the materials in Geneva without
its consent. Especially is this true if the prime contract
provided other prerequisites to the passage of title such
as acceptance or completion of the work.
Petitioner's chief objection is that the contract lacks
materiality and serves to confuse the issues. The Tax
Commission submits that the materiality of this contract
is clearly shown from the very nature of the contentions
of the petitioner.
Even assuming the ''remote relevancy'' suggested
by the petitioner, the contract should have been received.
24
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Davis, Volume II, Administrative Law, Section 14.01,
suggests that the direction of movement on the evidence
problem throughout the legal system, in the judicial
processes as well as the administrative processes, is toward (1) replacing rules with discretion, (2) admitting
all evidence that seems to the presiding officer relevant
and useful, and ( 3) relying upon the kind of evidence on
which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs. Admitting the fact that the Administrative
Procedure Act has not been enacted in this state as yet,
it is submitted that an administrative agency, sitting as
a quasi-judicial body, should not be strictly bound by the
exclusionary rules of evidence for jury cases. The provisions of Section 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act appear eminently fair. This Section provides:

''Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued
except upon consideration of the whole record or
any such portion thereof as may be cited by any
party and as supported by and in accordance with
the reliable probative and substantial evidence.''
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner cites several cases in support of its contention that this contract was improperly received. The
case of General Foods Corporation v. Brannon (7th Cir.
1948), 170 F. 2d 220, involving an attempt by the Secretary of Agriculture to impose certain sanctions upon
General Foods Corporation and others because of an
alleged attempt to manipulate the price of rye. The case
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was tried before a referee and heard and decided by a
Judicial Officer as though respondents were judged with
and found to have been engaged in a conspiracy, this notwithstanding the Government's express disclaimer that
any conspiracy or agreement existed. The totality of the
respondents' activities was relied upon as an incriminating circumstance against each, a case hardly determinative of the propriety of admission in the present case.
The case of Glen. Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment
Compensation Boa.rd of Review, 168 Pa. Super 534, 79
Atl. 2d 796 (1951), cited by petitioners, held only that
the finding of an administrative board may not be based
exclusively on incompetent evidence, and the case of
Phillips v. Unemployment Compen.sation Board of Review, 152 Pa. Super 75, 30 Atl. 2d 718 (1943), held that
the report of an investigator not himself a party to the
hearing should be made a part of the record for the information of the Unemployment Compensation Board.
The latter case is not inconsistent with the Tax Commission's position herein, and the totality of authority cited
by petitioner does not justify any other course of action
than that followed by the Tax Commission.
Petitioner further objects to a series of questions
propounded of l\1:r. Maynard Gage, Assistant Director of
Purchases for Geneva, who assisted in the negotiation and
signing of the contract in question, regarding the passage
of title of materials purchased by petitioner. Petitioner
contends the oral testimony eannot be introduced to vary
terms of a written eontract.
26
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As a general rule, petitioner is correct. However,
this is not the case where the contract is ambiguous or incomplete. In a number of cases, the courts have said that
oral evidence is admissible to explain the writing. Where
the instrument is fairly susceptible to more than one construction, it is admissible to have the aid of pertinent
facts and circumstances that will throw light on the intention of the parties to the contract in its execution. Penn
Co. v. W aUace, 346 Pa. 532, 31 Atl. 2d 71, 156 ALR 1
(1943); 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1147. The contract
in the instant case is apparently ambiguous as both petitioner and the Tax Commission cite its paragraphs in
an attempt to ascertain the passage of title.
For the above reasons, the Tax Commission contends
that it was proper to admit the contract in question into
evidence, together with additional testimony relating
thereto.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully urge that
the use tax deficiency assessed against the petitioner
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
F. BURTON HOWARD,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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